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ABSTRACT
Modern distributed cyber-physical systems (CPSs) en-
counter a large variety of physical faults and cyber anoma-
lies and in many cases, they are vulnerable to catas-
trophic fault propagation scenarios due to strong con-
nectivity among the sub-systems. This paper presents
a new data-driven framework for system-wide anomaly
detection for addressing such issues. The framework
is based on a spatiotemporal feature extraction scheme
built on the concept of symbolic dynamics for discover-
ing and representing causal interactions among the sub-
systems of a CPS. The extracted spatiotemporal fea-
tures are then used to learn system-wide patterns via
a Restricted Boltzmann Machine (RBM). The results
show that: (1) the RBM free energy in the off-nominal
conditions is different from that in the nominal condi-
tions and can be used for anomaly detection; (2) the
framework can capture multiple nominal modes with
one graphical model; (3) the case studies with simu-
lated data and an integrated building system validate
the proposed approach.
1. INTRODUCTION
With the advent ubiquitous sensing, advanced com-
putation and strong connectivity, modern distributed
cyber-physical systems (CPSs) such as power plants [10],
integrated buildings [11], transportation networks [28]
and power-grids [25] have shown tremendous potential
of increased efficiency, robustness and resilience - a fact
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that is reflected in great interest in CPS research shown
by the U.S. government [12], the EU [5], other coun-
tries around the world [26] and industry in general [2].
However, to realize such potential, effective modeling
and analysis tools have to be developed for CPSs that
are scalable, robust, flexible and adaptive. Most of the
current approaches lack in these qualities as they heav-
ily depend on domain knowledge based rules and first-
principle based models that need meticulous calibration
and validation.
From the perspective of performance monitoring and
diagnostics of distributed CPSs, the technical challenges
arise from a large number of subsystems that are highly
interactive [18] and operate in diverse modes. Although
physics-based modeling of individual small sub-systems,
developing models that capture all possible complex in-
teractions often become intractable. Data-driven mod-
eling can potentially alleviate such issues [3]. However,
most of such methods need examples of nominal and
all possible anomalous conditions (e.g., cyber attacks
and physical faults) which is intractable for real life sys-
tems. Therefore, anomaly detection approaches should
have (i) the potential to recognize most of the operat-
ing modes without anomaly as nominal, and (ii) an un-
supervised learning ability to distinguish the (possibly
unforeseen) anomalies from the nominal modes. More-
over, physical space generates mostly continuous tem-
poral information from sensors and actuators and the
cyber space generates mostly discrete event-driven data
while processing physical information. Such disparity in
fundamental properties and nature of information space
drives most of the current approaches to treat cyber and
physical spaces separately for modeling and analysis (a
detail survey can be found in [13]).
In this context, this work presents a data driven frame-
work for system-wide anomaly detection in distributed
CPSs, where a spatiotemporal feature extraction scheme
is built on the concept of symbolic dynamics [15] for dis-
covering and representing causal interactions between
the subsystems. Symbolic Dynamic Filtering (SDF), as
a data driven modeling of complex systems, has advan-
tages in describing different types of data with a uni-
form representation, named as data abstraction. Ab-
straction involves pre-processing and data space parti-
tioning for relevant variables (e.g., sensor time-series,
event logs) of the system [20], where such a represen-
tation helps modeling cyber and physical sub-systems
together. Features captured by SDF are used in forma-
tion of spatiotemporal pattern network (STPN) [9], a re-
cently proposed causal graphical modeling concept. The
causal modeling is followed by unsupervised learning of
various system-level nominal patterns [4]. Upon learn-
ing such models, the paper develops inference schemes
for detection of low probability events or anomalies.
2. BACKGROUND AND PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Spatiotemporal pattern network (STPN)
Symbolic dynamic filtering (SDF) has been recently
shown to be extremely effective for extracting key tex-
tures from time-series data for anomaly detection and
pattern classification [15]. The core idea is that a sym-
bol sequence (i.e., discretized time-series) emanated from
a process can be approximated as a Markov chain of
order D (also called depth), named as D-Markov ma-
chine [22] that captures key behavior of the underlying
process. The discretization or symbolization process is
called partitioning [15]. There are various approaches
proposed in the literature, depending on different objec-
tive functions [19], such as uniform partitioning (UP),
maximum entropy partitioning (MEP), maximally bi-
jective discretization (MBD) [23]. This study uses sim-
ple uniform partitioning. The D-Markov machine is es-
sentially a probabilistic finite state automaton (PFSA)
that can be described by states (representing various
parts of the data space) and probabilistic transitions
among them that can be learnt from data. Related def-
initions of deterministic finite state automaton (DFSA),
PFSA, D-Markov machine, xD-Markov machine and
the learning schemes can be found in [22].
With this setup, a spatiotemporal pattern network
(STPN) is defined below.
Definition. A PFSA based STPN is a 4-tupleWD ≡
(Qa,Σb,Πab,Λab): (a, b denote nodes of the STPN)
1. Qa = {q1, q2, · · · , q|Qa|} is the state set correspond-
ing to symbol sequences Sa;
2. Σb = {σ0, · · · , σ|Σb|−1} is the alphabet set of sym-
bol sequence Sb;
3. Πab is the symbol generation matrix of size |Qa| ×
|Σb|, the ijth element of Πab denotes the probabil-
ity of finding the symbol σj in the symbol string
sb while making a transition from the state qi in
the symbol sequence Sa; while self-symbol genera-
tion matrices are called atomic patterns (APs) i.e.,
when a = b, cross-symbol generation matrices are
called relational patterns (RPs) i.e., when a 6= b.
4. Λab denotes a metric that can represent the impor-
tance of the learnt pattern (or degree of causality)
for a→ b which is a function of Πab.
An illustration of STPN is shown in Fig. 1.
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Figure 1: Extraction of atomic and relational patterns
(using D-Markov and xD-Markov machines respectively
and D = 1, i.e., states and symbols are equivalent) to
characterize individual sub-system behavior and interac-
tion behavior among different sub-systems.
Information based criteria are often used to compute
a metric such as Λij , e.g., transfer entropy [27] and mu-
tual information [24]. Detailed description of mutual in-
formation based causality metric in the context of APs
and RPs can be found in [9, 22].
2.2 Restricted Boltzmann Machine (RBM)
RBM has grabbed a lot of recent attention in the Deep
Learning community [7, 16] for unsupervised feature ex-
traction. The basic structure of RBM is shown in unsu-
pervised learning layer in Fig. 2 (top-left corner). As an
energy based model [7], weights and biases are learnt so
that the feature configurations observed during nominal
operation of the system gets low energy (or high prob-
ability). Consider a system state that is described by
a set of visible variables v = (v1, v2, · · · , vD) and a set
of hidden (latent) variables h = (h1, h2, · · · , hF ). The
variables can be binary or real-valued depending on the
need. Now, each joint configuration of these variables
determines a particular state of the system and an en-
ergy value E(v,h) is associated with it. The energy
values are functions of the weights of the links between
the variables (for RBM, internal links within the visible
variables and the hidden variables are not considered)
and bias terms related to the variables.
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Figure 2: A data driven framework for anomaly detection in distributed CPS (i) Spatiotemporal graphical modeling
learn nominal behavior of subsystems and their interactions in various operation modes, and system-wide patterns
are learnt by an RBM, (ii) distribution of free energy is used to detect low probability events or anomalies
With this setup, the probability of a state P (v,h)
depends only on the energy of the configuration (v, h)
and follows the Boltzmann distribution
P (v,h) =
e−E(v,h)∑
v,h e
−E(v,h)
(1)
Typically, during training, weights and biases are ob-
tained via maximizing likelihood of the training data.
3. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY
The proposed data-driven framework for system-wide
anomaly detection is shown in Fig. 2. During training,
the steps of learning the STPN+RBM model are:
1. Learn APs and RPs (individual node behaviors
and pair-wise interaction behaviors) from the mul-
tivariate training symbol sequences
2. Consider short symbol subsequences from the train-
ing sequences and evaluate Λij ∀i, j for each short
subsequence
3. For one subsequence, based on a user-defined thresh-
old on Λij , assign state 0 or 1 for each AP and RP;
thus every subsequence leads to a binary vector of
length L, where L = #AP +#RP
4. An RBM is used for modeling system-wide behav-
ior with nodes in the visible layer corresponding to
APs and RPs
5. The RBM is trained using binary vectors generated
from training subsequences
3.1 Training STPN+RBM model of a CPS
Consider a multivariate training time series (nominal
operation data in the present context), X = {XA(t), t ∈
N, A = 1, 2, · · · , f}, where f is the number of variables
or dimension of the time series. At first, symbolization
and PFSA learning are performed to extract atomic and
relational patterns for the corresponding STPN with f
vertices and f2 edges. In this case, let the set of sym-
bol sequences be S = {SA}. Then, we define a short
subsequence, X˜ = {X˜A(t), t ∈ N∗, A = 1, 2, · · · , f},
where N∗ is a subset of N. Essentially, different (possi-
bly overlapping) time windows (represented by t ∈ N∗)
extracted from the overall training data set can be con-
sidered as the short subsequences. Similar to the pre-
vious notation, a set of symbolic subsequences for one
time window is denoted as S˜ = {S˜A}.
The next step is to compute Λij ∀i, j for every short
subsequence extracted from the entire time series. Al-
though information theoretic measures (as mentioned
above) can be good candidates, estimation of such met-
rics need a large number of data points and hence, can
be prohibitive at the anomaly detection phase. In this
paper, we propose a new measure of Λij ∀i, j based on
the statistical inference strategy developed in [21, 1].
Computation of this metric involves two phases, namely
(i) modeling phase and (ii) inference phase.
Modeling Phase: The entire training data is consid-
ered in the context of the STPN,WD ≡ (Q
a,Σb,Πab,Λab).
As the entire set of symbol sequences is denoted by
S, let the set of state sequences (obtained by apply-
ing the depth D on the symbol sequence) be denoted
as Q = {Qa, a = 1, 2, · · · , f}. Recall, a pattern Πab
depends on the state sequence Qa and the symbol se-
quence Sb. With this setup, each row of Πab is treated
as a random vector. For themth row, a prior probability
density function fΠabm |{Qa,Sb} for the random vector Π
ab
m ,
conditioned on the joint state-symbol sequence {Qa, Sb}
following the Dirchlet distribution is described below
fΠabm |{Qa,Sb} =
1
B(αabm )
|Σb|∏
n=1
(θabmn)
αabmn−1 (2)
where θabm is a realization of the random vector Π
ab
m ,
namely
θabmn =
[
θabm1 θ
ab
m2 · · · θ
ab
m|Σb|
]
and the normalizing constant is
B(αabm ) ,
|Σb|∏
n=1
Γ(αabmn)
Γ(
|Σb|∑
n=1
αabmn)
(3)
where αabmn , [α
ab
m1 α
ab
m2 · · · α
ab
m|Σb|] with α
ab
mn = N
ab
mn+1
and Nabmn is the number of times the symbol σ
b
n ∈ Σ
b is
emanated after the state qam ∈ Q
a, i.e.,
Nabmn , |{(Q
a(k), Sb(k+1)) : Sb(k+1) = σbn | Q
a(k) = qam}|
(4)
where Qa(k) is the kth state in the state sequence Qa
and Sb(k + 1) is the (k + 1)th symbol in the symbol
sequence Sb.
It follows from Eq. 3 that
B(αabm ) =
|Σb|∏
n=1
Γ(Nabmn + 1)
Γ(
∑|Σb|
n=1N
ab
mn + |Σ
b|)
=
|Σb|∏
n=1
(Nabmn)!
(Nabm + |Σ
b| − 1)!
(5)
by using the relation Γ(n) = (n− 1)!.
With the Markov property of the learned PFSA, the
row-vectors, {Πabm , m = 1, 2, · · · , |Q
a|}, are statistically
independent of each other. Therefore, it follows Eqs.
2 and 5 that the prior joint density fΠabm |{Qa,Sb} of the
probability morph matrix Πab, conditioned on the joint
state-symbol sequences {Qa, Sb}, is given by
fΠab|{Qa,Sb}(θ
ab|{Qa, Sb})
=
|Qa|∏
m=1
fΠabm |{Qa,Sb}(θ
ab
m |{Q
a, Sb})
=
|Qa|∏
m=1
(Nabm + |Σ
b| − 1)!
|Σb|∏
n=1
(θabm )
Nabmn
(Nabmn)!
(6)
where θab = [(θab1 )
T (θab2 )
T · · · (θab|Qa|)
T ] ∈ [0, 1]|Q
a|×|Σb|.
Inference Phase: After modeling with the entire set
of training sequences, the goal of the inference phase is
to compute the metric Λab(Q˜) for a given short subse-
quence described by Q˜ and S˜. The value of this metric
suggests the importance of the pattern Πab or the de-
gree of causality in a → b as evidenced by the short
subsequence. In this context, we consider
Λab(Q˜, S˜) ∝ Pr({Q˜a, S˜b}|Πab) (7)
where the probability of the joint state-symbol subse-
quence is a product of independent multinominal distri-
butions given that the exact morph matrix is known.
Pr({Q˜a, S˜b}|Πab) =
|Qa|∏
m=1
(N˜m)!
|Σb|∏
n=1
(Πabmn)
N˜mn
(Nabmn)!
(8)
where, the definition of N˜abmn is similar to N
ab
mn in the
context of the short subsequence.
With similar derivation in [21], the metric Λab(Q˜, S˜)
can be obtained as follows
Λab(Q˜, S˜) = K
|Qa|∏
m=1
(N˜abm )!(N
ab
m + |Σ
b| − 1)!
(N˜abm +N
ab
m + |Σ
b| − 1)!
|Σb|∏
n=1
(N˜abmn +N
ab
mn)!
(N˜abmn)!(N
ab
mn)!
(9)
where, K is a proportional constant.
Thus, with Eq. 9, importance metrics of APs (i.e.,
when a = b) and RPs (i.e., when a 6= b) are obtained
with respect to the short subsequences. In order to train
the system-wide RBM, the metrics can be further nor-
malized and converted to binary states (0 for low values
and 1 for high values) for APs and RPs. Note, from
each subsequence, all the APs and RPs together form
a binary vector of length L = f2 (L = #AP + #RP ,
where #AP = f , #RP = f × (f−1)). One such binary
vector is treated as one training example for the system-
wide RBM (with f2 number of visible units) and many
such examples are generated from different short sub-
sequences extracted from the overall training sequence.
Then a maximum likelihood method is used to train the
RBM as mentioned in 2.2. Note, although in this paper
we convert the Λi,j metrics to binary values for the ease
of RBM training, it is not mandatory for this training
process.
Remark. With an optimized time lag in STPN learn-
ing, the STPN+RBM model can handle variable time
lag situations and significantly reduces the complexity of
the overall learning process, in comparison with other
potentially spatiotemporal approaches, such as recur-
rent neural networks (RNNs).
3.2 Anomaly detection process
The anomaly detection process developed here uses
the concept of free energy of RBM which is an energy
based probabilistic graphical model. The energy func-
tion for an RBM is defined as
E(v,h) = −hTWv− bTv− cTh (10)
where W are the weights of the hidden units, b and
c are the biases of the visible units and hidden units,
respectively.
With the weights and biases of RBM, free energy can
be obtained which is the energy that a single visible layer
pattern would need to have in order to have the same
probability as all of the configurations that contain v
[8]
e−F (v) =
∑
h
e−E(v,h) (11)
Another expression of free energy estimation is [8]
F (v) = −
∑
i
viai −
∑
j
log(1 + ebj+
∑
i
viwij ) (12)
During training, weights and biases are obtained such
that the training data has low energy. Therefore, dur-
ing testing, an anomalous pattern should manifest itself
as a low probability (high energy) configuration which
can be used for anomaly detection. To detect an occur-
rence of anomaly, short testing subsequences are con-
verted into an f2-dimensional binary vector with the
same inference phase of the training process. Multiple
testing (possibly overlapping) subsequences can be used
to obtain a distribution of free energy. For the nominal
condition, the distribution of free energy should be close
to that of the training data, while the anomalous data
should result in a different distribution of free energy
(with increase in expected free energy).
To compare the free energy distributions of testing
data and training data, Kullback-Leibler divergence is
considered [14].
Since the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence is a non-
symmetric information measure of distance between dis-
tribution P and distribution Q, a symmetric Kullback-
Leibler Distance (KLD) [14] is used which is defined as,
KLD(P ||Q) = KL(P ||Q) +KL(Q||P ) (13)
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
4.1 Anomaly detection in simulation data
4.1.1 Synthetic data with Vector Autoregressive (VAR)
Process
Vector autoregressive (VAR) process is widely applied
in economics and other sciences as it is flexible and sim-
ple for multivariate time series data [6]. The basic model
of VAR process Y (t) = yi,t, i = (1, 2, · · · , f), t ∈ N is
defined as
yi,t =
p∑
k=1
n∑
j=1
Aki,jyj,t−k + µt, j = (1, 2, · · · , f) (14)
where p is time lag order, Ai,j is the coefficient of the
influence on ith time series caused by jth time series,
and µt is an error process with the assumption of white
noise with zero mean, that is E(µt) = 0, the covariance
matrix, E(µtµ
′
t) = Σµ is time invariant.
Synthetic multivariate data is generated using the VAR
process in this study. A hierarchical structure of five-
vertex network is considered with different interactions
among vertices. Various interaction patterns represent
nominal and off-nominal conditions in a distributed CPS.
Data for two case studies are generated: Case I: six pat-
terns are defined, where the first one is considered as
nominal condition and the others as anomalous; Case
II: eight patterns are defined, where the first three are
considered as nominal conditions, and remaining five as
anomalous. The second case is to simulate the CPS
scenario with multiple nominal operating modes.
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ple testing samples from each nominal/anomalous con-
dition
STPNs are learnt from raw data generated by the
VAR models representing different interaction patterns.
For unsupervised RBM learning, only nominal patterns
are used to obtain the weights and biases. Data from all
patterns are used with the trained RBM to compute the
free energy with respect to the different pattern inputs.
Evaluation of free energy is performed with Gaussian
assumption of multiple testing inputs.
4.1.2 Case Study I: Single nominal mode
While the details of STPN learning is skipped for
brevity, the predefined graphical models are shown in
Fig. 3. Atomic and relational patterns of the nomi-
nal condition are used for training the RBM. Testing
data corresponding to all 6 patterns are used to gen-
erate the probability distribution of free energy with
respect to the trained RBM and the results are shown
in Fig. 4. It is evident, while the free energy distribu-
tion of the nominal pattern matches quite closely with
that of the training patterns, free energy distributions
of other patterns are quite different and moves to the
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Figure 3: Graphical models defined for synthetic data generation and anomaly detection, where anomalous conditions
occur due to failure of one vertex and the causal links to the failed vertex are lost
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Figure 5: Graphical models defined for synthetic data generation and anomaly detection, where the nominal condition
consists of (first) three graphs representing three different operation modes, and the others are considered as anomalous
right. This means such patterns have high free energy
and hence low probability of occurrence. Quantitatively,
the KLD metrics between the free energy distribution of
the training/nominal pattern and those of all the other
test patterns are 0.01, 6.82, 21.70, 7.63, 4.17, and 9.08
respectively.
Free energy
-40 -30 -20 -10 0
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
de
ns
ity
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14 Training
Nominal 1
Nominal 2
Nominal 3
Anomaly 1
Anomaly 2
Anomaly 3
Anomaly 4
Anomaly 5
Figure 6: Distribution of free energy of RBM with mul-
tiple testing samples for each nominal/anomalous con-
dition
4.1.3 Case Study II: Multiple nominal modes
Similar to the previous case, the predefined graphical
models are shown in Fig. 5 and the free energy distri-
butions are shown in Fig. 6. As expected, free energy
distributions for first three patterns (Nominal 1, 2 and
3) are similar to that of the training data with KLD val-
ues 0.002, 0.068 and 0.040 respectively. The figure also
shows that anomalous patterns can be clearly identi-
fied for conditions 4 through 8 (with KLD values 6.067,
1.461, 2.420, 3.199, and 0.906 respectively). Overall, the
result clearly shows that the proposed framework can
capture multiple nominal behaviors within one model
while slight change in causality patterns can be detected
efficiently.
4.2 Validation on a Real System - Integrated
Building
The Interlock House, an Iowa NSF EPSCOR (exper-
imental program to stimulate competitive research) (#
EPS-1101284.) community lab, located at the Honey
Creek Resort State Park, Iowa is a smart home designed
to “interlock” with its environment, its occupants, and
its active and passive energy systems. The goal of this
test bed is to perform as a net-zero energy house that
(ideally) produces as much energy as it consumes. With
all its intelligent sensing and control systems, it can be
Figure 7: Radiant floor heating subsysem within the integrated building system, including 7 sensors measuring tem-
perature, flow rate, and power consumption. Sensors 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 are temperature sensors, sensors 4 and 7 are
flow rate sensors, sensors 8 and 9 measure power consumption of the heating tank (not marked in the figure).
classified as a typical cyber-physical system, with col-
laborating computational elements controlling the inter-
connected physical sub-systems. One of the key systems
for building operation is the HVAC (Heating, Ventila-
tion & Air-Conditioning) system that is comprised of
the following three independent sub-systems: (a) Radi-
ant Floor Heating (Space Heating), (b) Domestic Wa-
ter Heating, and (c) Space Cooling and Ventilation. For
this paper, the Radiant Floor Heating subsystem is cho-
sen and studied. A schematic of the Radiant Floor Heat-
ing system is shown in Fig. 7.
Sensor data related to its operation is collected for a
period of 1 year from Jul., 2014 to Jun., 2015. Within
this time-frame, data collected for two different seasonal
operational modes (viz. winter and summer modes) is
studied. For winter mode of operation, the month of
Nov., 2014 is chosen and Jul., 2015 is chosen for sum-
mer mode. Typical data for two representative sensors
are shown in Fig. 8, where features vary in seasons and
are used for unsupervised learning. Another timeframe
from Feb., 2015 to Jun., 2015 is considered for valida-
tion of the proposed approach that covers a wide range
of behavior over both winter and summer, as shown in
Fig. 9.
Winter Mode study (Nov., 2014): In Winter, peri-
odic heating of the radiant floor space is required. The
heating is set to start every morning at 5:00 am if the
indoor temperature at that point is below 19.5 deg C.
The heating turns off when the heating setpoint (plus
the dead band) is reached, which was around 20 deg C,
with the dead band being 1 deg C (+0.5C/-0.5C).
• This is evident from Fig.8 (a) where, we see a
rise in the temperature of the water supplied from
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Figure 9: Data collected at the Interlock House during
Feb., 2015 – Jun., 2015.
the space heating tank to radiant floor at approxi-
mately every 24 hour time interval, when demand
for heating is high. The temperature of the sup-
plied water gradually decreases as demand for heat-
ing decreases and it rises again at 5:00 am next day,
if the set conditions are met.
• Consequently, it is seen in Fig.8 (b) that the flowme-
ter measuring flow of water returning from the ra-
diant floor records flow of water in a similar pat-
tern. Flow measurements are recorded at every 24
hour interval when heating is required, depending
on the set conditions.
• It is observed that on the fourth day, flow mea-
surements remained zero and floor heating was not
carried out. This is because, the indoor tempera-
ture that day remained above 19.5 deg C at 5 am.
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Figure 8: Data collected at the Interlock House in winter and summer, the subsystem includes 9 sensors measuring
various temperatures, flow rates, and power consumptions.
Summer Mode study (July, 2014): In Summer, water
is heated in the Space Heating Tank periodically, as is
evident from Fig. 8 (c), but as floor heating in summer
is not required, supply to the radiant floor remains 0 all
throughout, as is evident from Fig. 8 (d).
Anomaly Detection: On the study conducted on the
data from Feb., 2015 – Jun., 2015, we notice that anoma-
lies creep in certain sensor observations (see Fig. 9).
While the first anomaly starts around March 26, 2015
(day 55 in the plot) and continues till June with erro-
neous readings in several sensors, a second anomaly ap-
pears during June, 2015. However, careful observation
shows that the second anomaly is extremely intermit-
tent and only manifests itself in a few number of (three
out of nine) sensor measurements.
Online anomaly detection is carried out using the pro-
posed technique and the results are shown in Fig. 10.
The algorithm detects the first anomaly quite easily that
appears as a large peak in the plot. The second anomaly
which is local, intermittent and not much pronounced,
is also detected and appears as the second sharp peak
in the plot. Another crucial observation is that we use
different sets of test data for two different modes of op-
eration (summer and winter). The proposed technique
can effectively handle nominal data for all such modes
without false detection.
4.3 Discussions
Anomalies in distributed CPSs vary in mechanisms,
features, and duration, and this makes anomaly detec-
tion difficult, especially the collection of labeled data for
all possible anomalies. The proposed framework in this
work only needs nominal data, and anomaly detection
is considered as a low probability event conditioned on
System-wide anomaly
Local anomaly
Figure 10: Online anomaly detection during Feb. 2015
– Jun. 2015.
the nominal data. The results show that the free energy
distribution during an anomalous condition is different
from that of the nominal condition, and a metric such
as KLD can be used to quantify the change. Further-
more, it has the potential for monitoring all the way
from small physical degradation to severe faults or cy-
ber attacks, where a small KLD signifies slight change in
the causal pattern (STPN) that possibly indicates early-
stage degradation, localized cyber anomaly or precursor
of a fault.
Multiple nominal modes: The proposed frame-
work can capture multiple modes as nominal condition
(e.g., Fig. 5 and Fig. 8), within a single model and
hence reduces the modeling and reasoning complexity.
Traditionally, a graphical model such as STPN can rep-
resent one operating mode at a time, and multiple STPNs
are required to represent various operating modes. More-
over, it is difficult to determine the number of STPNs
needed for representing all nominal modes, as a small
number of changes in the patterns can result in a larger
number of combinations, which may cause dimension
explosion and extreme difficulty in real life applications.
Local and Global anomalies: In the simulated
cases shown in Fig. 5, only one causal connection is re-
moved (e.g., arrow 1 → 2 is disconnected in STPN 4,
comparing with STPNs 1, 2, and 3), and it represents a
local anomaly. In the real case study, most of the mea-
surements are abnormal during days 55-70 in Fig. 9,
and it is a type of global anomaly. For both of types of
anomalies, the proposed approach can distinguish them
from the nominal modes.
Mixed data types: In the real case study (Section
4.2), mixed data types are used. For example, tem-
perature measurement in Fig. 8 (a) is a representative
continuous sensor observation. On the other hand, the
flow rate measurement in Fig. 8 (b) appears as fairly
discrete due to the on-off control schedule. The pro-
posed approach is able to extract features from both
types of data and fuse them into one model. This is
a critical need for a distributed CPS with continuous
temporal information from sensors and actuators of the
physical space and discrete event-driven data from the
cyber space.
Robustness: Although detailed false alarm and missed
detection studies will be done in near future, from a
qualitative standpoint, the approach is seen to be quite
robust as it is designed to identify only persistent anoma-
lies. This property is inherent as the anomaly detection
is performed with short subsequences and not based
on individual data points. As a consequence, no false
alarms are observed when only a few sensors show bad
readings for a very short time window. For example,
error in readings occurs occasionally during the first 50
days (in Fig. 9), where no anomaly is detected during
that period (in Fig. 10).
Remark: The proposed framework is categorized as
unsupervised because unlike typical diagnostic frame-
works, no labeled training data for various fault types
and fault locations are required; only assumption made
for the training data is that it represents nominal condi-
tion(s) with a high probability. Even with such limited
training data, the proposed tool has the potential of
identifying root-cause of a detected anomaly. Demon-
stration of such a capability remains a critical future
work. Furthermore, for learning multiple STPNs with
one-layer RBM, the results are acceptable in the above
cases. However, differences among nominal modes may
be quite large in some cases and one-layer RBMmay not
capture all the features in such cases. To address this
issue, stacked RBM (i.e., a deep belief network (DBN))
can be used [16, 17] to learn more complex features.
5. CONCLUSIONS
This work presents a new data-driven framework for
system-wide anomaly detection to address a wide-range
of nominal operating modes and unforeseen anomalous
situations without comprehensive labeled training data
in distributed CPSs. The framework involves a spa-
tiotemporal feature extraction scheme for discovering
and representing causal interactions among the subsys-
tems of a CPS, and a free energy estimation of system-
wide patterns using an RBM. The results show that
the proposed framework can capture multiple diverse
nominal modes within a single probabilistic graphical
model, and detect anomalies via identifying a low prob-
ability event. Multiple case studies with simulation and
real data validate accuracy, robustness, ability to handle
mixed data type and adaptiveness (i.e., local vs. global)
of the proposed method.
While the current work is focusing on validating the
method for a large variety of scenarios, quantifying false
alarm and missed detection rates, further works will
pursue the following: (i) using the graphical model for
root-cause analysis for various anomalies, (ii) stacked
RBM approach to capture more complex nominal pat-
terns and (iii) detection of simultaneous multiple faults
in distributed CPS.
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